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Abstract 
In this paper, we present a Secure Routing 
Protocol for Sensor Networks (SecRout) to safeguard 
sensor networks under different types of attacks. The 
SecRout protocol uses the symmetric cryptography to 
secure messages, and uses a small cache in sensor 
nodes to record the partial routing path (previous and 
next nodes) to the destination. It guarantees that the 
destination will be able to identify and discard the 
tampered messages and ensure that the messages 
received are not tampered. Comparing the 
performance with non-secure routing protocol AODV 
[1] (Ad hoc on Demand Distance Vector Routing), the 
SecRout  protocol only has a small byte overhead (less 
than 6%), but packet delivery ratio is almost same as 
AODV and packet latency is better than AODV after 
the route discovery.
Keywords: Routing, Security, Sensor Networks 
1. Introduction 
For many sensor network applications, security is 
one of the most important aspects [2,3]. Secure routing 
protocols in sensor networks present challenges due to 
resource limitations, the ad hoc nature, and no 
centrally administered secure routers. An existing 
route could be broken down or a new route could be 
prevented from being established because of the 
attacks [4-6]. There are several examples of attacks 
against routing in sensor networks. For instance, the 
routing packet is dropped or tampered; the attacker 
inserts spurious messages in the sensor network.  
In this paper, we propose a Secure Routing 
Protocol for Sensor Networks (SecRout) to safeguard 
sensor networks using the two-level architecture. The 
sensor network is divided into clusters with one cluster 
head for each cluster. The nodes in the cluster send the 
data to the cluster head instead of sending data directly 
to the sink node (the destination node). Then, the 
cluster head aggregates the data from the sensor nodes 
in the cluster and sends it to the sink node. The two-
level architecture can greatly lower the message 
overhead. It can greatly save the energy, and decrease 
the usage of memory and bandwidth.  
The SecRout protocol guarantees that the sink 
node will be able to identify and discard the tampered 
messages and ensure that the accepted messages are 
not tempered with. The asymmetric cryptography 
algorithms [7-9] for cryptography and authentication 
are not suitable for sensor networks due to the large 
computation and communication overhead. The 
SecRout protocol uses symmetric cryptography to 
secure the messages, and uses a small cache in sensor 
nodes to record the partial routing path (previous and 
next nodes) to the sink node. Due to the frequent 
communications in the cluster, we use the cluster key 
in the cluster to secure the messages. The cluster head 
uses the preloaded key to secure aggregated messages 
to send them to the sink node. 
In the remainder of the paper, the detail protocol 
description is given in Section 2. Section 3 describes 
security analysis. Section 4 provides performance 
evaluation of the SecRout protocol. Section 5 
addresses the related works. We conclude in Section 6. 
2. Secure Routing Protocol 
In the proposed SecRout  protocol, we assume that 
every node has a unique identity (ID) and a preloaded 
key [4]. The network is divided into clusters after self-
organization [10] and each cluster has a cluster head, 
which knows the ID of the sensor node in its cluster. 
The sensor node knows the ID of its cluster head. The 
sink node knows the topology of the sensor network 
after self-organization. We assume that the sink node 
is a super node, which has more power and memory. It 
stores a table containing (ID, Key) pairs of all the 
sensor nodes. In the proposed SecRout protocol, we 
have one sink node, which is trusted. All other sensor 
nodes can be compromised.  
We build the secure route from the source node to 
the sink node using SecRout. We guarantee that a 
packet reaches the sink node even if malicious nodes 
exist on the route. It guarantees that the message is 
originated from the authenticated source node and is 
not tampered on the route. In our secure route 
discovery, the malicious node on the route can be 
detected. Therefore, the route created using our route 
discovery protocol is secure. The SecRout protocol has 
the following four features: 
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1) The routing packet and data packet are very small 
because they only include the partial path information. 
We do not use the source routing because in source 
routing the identities of the traversed intermediate 
nodes are accumulated in the route request [11].  
2) We create the route first, and then we forward the 
data to the sink node along the route. We do not flood 
the data packet to the sink node because the data 
packet has much bigger size than the routing packet. 
3) It uses the two-level architecture, where the cluster 
head aggregates the data, then sends it to the sink node 
along the route. It lowers the communication overhead.  
4) It only uses high efficient symmetric cryptographic 
operations to secure messages.  
Table 1 provides the notation description which 
will be used in this paper. 
Table 1. Notation description
Notation Description 
A, B Principles, such as sensor nodes 
M1|M2 The concatenation of messages M1 and M2
KA The secret key held by A
MAC(K,M) The message authentication code of 
message M using a symmetric key K [12] 
EK(M) Encryption of message M with key K [13] 
NA A nonce generated by node A, which is a 
random number 
IDA The identity of node A
2.1. Secure Route Discovery 
The source node initiates the route discovery 
process through sending the route request (RREQ) to 
the sink node. When the sink node receives the RREQ,
it creates the route reply (RREP) to the source node. 
After the route discovery, every node along the route 
has established the appropriate routing table. 
2.1.1. Secure Route Request. The Source node 
initiates the route discovery by broadcasting the RREQ











Where IDRREQ is a random number.  
The intermediate node only accepts the first 
RREQ according to IDRREQ. The routing table is 
updated through adding the ID of the previous two 
hops, IDsource, and IDRREQ. Then, it updates the RREQ.
It adds its ID to the RREQ which is directly from the 
source node. Or it replaces IDthis, IDpre embedded in 
the RREQ with its previous and current ID if the 
RREQ is from other nodes. Finally, it broadcasts the 











Where IDpre and IDthis are the IDs of previous and 
current node. 
When the sink node receives the RREQ, it gets the 
key of the source node from the (ID, Key) pair table, 
which is used to verify the MAC. It only accepts the 
first RREQ with the valid MAC according to the 
source node and IDRREQ. Then it stores IDsource, IDRREQ
and previous two hops in the routing table. 
2.1.2. Secure Route Reply. When the sink node 















Where IDnext is the ID of the next node. Then it 
broadcasts it. 
The intermediate node with the same ID as the 
IDpre embedded in the RREP updates the IDpre, IDthis
and IDnext in the RREP with the IDs of its previous, 
current, and next nodes. Then it broadcasts the updated 
RREP packet. Simultaneously it updates its routing 
table to add IDs of the next two hops. If it cannot get 
acknowledge from its next hop within the specified 
time, the previous node may be a malicious node. It 
drops any other RREQs during the next route 
discovery. If it detects the RREP broadcasted by its 
previous hop with the wrong IDpre since it stores two 
previous hops in its routing table, it blocks its previous 
hop which may be a malicious node.  
The source node verifies the MAC after it receives 
the RREP. If the verification succeeds, it inserts the 
IDs of the next two hops on the route to its routing 
table. After the route discovery, the intermediate node 
has the routing table as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Routing table
Source Node Previous Two Hops Next Two Hops 
IDsource1 IDpre2, IDpre1 IDnext1, IDnext2
IDsource2 IDpre2, IDpre1 IDnext1, IDnext2
… … … 
IDsourceN IDpre2, IDpre1 IDnext1, IDnext2
2.1.3. Secure Route Maintenance. If a sensor node 
has no route in its routing table when it starts to send 
the data, it initiates the route discovery. If the source 
node gets the error message after it sends data or 
routing packet, or it is out of the specified time, it 
triggers a new route discovery. 
2.2. Secure Data Forwarding 
The SecRout protocol is based on the two-level 
architecture. The cluster heads are at the higher level, 
and the other nodes are at the lower level. The cluster 
head aggregates the data from the nodes in its cluster. 
Then it sends it to the sink node. We use the cluster 
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key to provide the secure communication in the 
cluster. The cluster key can be established during the 
self-organization [4].  We use the preloaded key to 
secure the message which is sent to the sink node.  
2.2.1. Secure Data Forwarding in the Cluster. A 
sensor node sends the data packet to its cluster head 
using the cluster key, which is constructed as follows: 
{ })](|,[|)(| dataEIDCKMACdataEID CKCK
Where ID is the ID of the cluster head, and CK is the 
cluster key shared by the nodes within the cluster. The 
node with the same ID as the ID embedded in the data 
packet such as the cluster head verifies the MAC. If the 
verification succeeds, it decrypts the data using the 
cluster key. Then it aggregates the data from the 
sensor nodes in the cluster, and constructs the data 
packet which will be sent to the sink node. 
2.2.2. Secure Data Forwarding among the Clusters. 
The cluster head becomes the source node after it 
aggregates the data. If there is a route in the routing 

















Where QID is the Query ID from the sink node, which 
is a random number. Then it broadcasts it.  
The intermediate node with the same ID as the 
IDnext embedded in the packet will rebroadcast the 
updated packet, where the IDthis and IDnext are replaced 
by its ID and the ID of the next hop in the routing 
table. Other intermediate nodes drop the packet.   
If the source node can not receive the packet again 
that the next hop rebroadcasts, it triggers a new route 
discovery. If the intermediate node cannot get the 
packet broadcasted by the next hop within a certain 
time, it reports the error message to the source node. 
Simultaneously it adds the next hop in its blacklist. It 
will not accept the RREP from the node in its blacklist.  
After the sink node receives the packet, it verifies 
the MAC using the key of the source node from the 
{ID, Key) pair table. If the verification succeeds, it 
gets the result by decrypting the encrypted data.  
2.2.3. Further Data Verification. After the sink node 
gets the data packet, two operations need to be 
executed: 1) the sink node compares the replies from 
other cluster heads which are residing the neighboring 
clusters of the source node; 2) the sink node will 
compare the replies with the history record. 
If the data packet is abnormal, the sink node must 
verify it by sending the further request query to the 
nodes in the cluster as shown in Figure 1. They 
broadcast the result of the request query to the sink 

















The sink node continues the further analysis after it 







Figure 1. Reply verification 
2.3. Secure Query Dissemination 
The sink node wants to get the information from a 
particular area or from the whole sensor network. 
According to these two scenarios, the request query 
(reqQ) is respectively sent to a particular area or the 
whole sensor network.  
2.3.1. Query a Particular Area. The sink node 
checks its routing table whether the route to the cluster 
head of that area exists. If yes, it sends the reqQ
packet to the cluster head of that area, which is 

















 Otherwise, it broadcasts the reqQ packet to the 

















 When the cluster head receives the query request 
packet, it verifies the MAC. If the verification 
succeeds, it decrypts the reqQ using its secret key. 
Then it sends the reqQ to the nodes in that cluster 
using its cluster key, which is constructed as follows: 
{ })](|,[|)(| reqQEIDCKMACreqQEID GKCK
Where ID is the ID of the cluster head, and CK is the 
cluster key. The nodes in the cluster receive reqQ after 
they decrypt the packet using the cluster key. 
2.3.2. Query the Whole Sensor Network. The sink 
node broadcasts the plaintext reqQ, which can be 
eavesdropped, modified or dropped by the malicious 
node. However, the reqQ can reach any sensor node 
even if a malicious node drops it because of broadcast. 
The sensor nodes get the query result according to the 
reqQ. The query result is the most important. In our 
approach, either the sink node gets the correct 
information or it detects that the tampered query reply. 
The query reply ReplyQ is constructed as follows: 
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Then the sensor node applies the same technique as 
data forwarding process. But unlike data forwarding, 
the query reply includes the reqQ, which is also 
authenticated using MAC. If a malicious node modifies 
the reqQ, the sink node can verify it using MAC.
3. Security Analysis 
We divide the attacks into two categories 
according to the compromised nodes. First, the source 
node is a normal node, but the intermediate node is a 
malicious node; the second, the source node is a 
malicious node. If the intermediate node is a malicious 
node, it can perform the following three actions: 1) 






Figure 2. Sensor networks embedded 
malicious nodes 
3.1. Intermediate Node Broadcasts Messages
In the RREQ process, the intermediate node 
broadcasts the updated RREQ and creates the routing 
table. The malicious node (Node M) may have three 
choices to attack this process: Case 1, it updates the 
RREQ by inserting the wrong ID of the current node; 
Case 2, it does not create the routing table, or it creates 
it with the wrong information; Case 3, it updates the 
RREQ by inserting the wrong ID of the previous node. 
Case 1: The next hop (Node N) records the wrong ID
of the previous node in its routing table. When the 
RREP reaches Node N, it is updated using the 
tampered ID of the previous node. Other nodes drop 
this RREP since their ID does not match the tampered 
ID. The node N detects that its previous hop is a 
malicious node since it cannot hear its rebroadcast. 
Then it refuses to broadcast other RREQs and the sink 
node selects other routes during next route discovery. 
Case 2: When the RREP packet reaches Node M, it 
broadcasts it with a wrong ID of the previous node 
since it has incorrect information in its routing table. 
Node N can detect the tampered RREP broadcasted by 
Node M since its routing table stores two previous 
hops. It blacklists Node M. 
Case 3: If Node M broadcasts the RREQ with the 
wrong ID of its previous node, the previous node can 
detect it through comparing its ID with the ID of the 
previous node embedded in the RREQ. It blacklists the 
malicious node M and informs the source node. The 
source node blocks the malicious node M. It triggers 











If the malicious node M receives the RREQ, it 















Its neighbors ignore it since the IDM is the same as the 
IDthis embedded in the RREQ. If Node M tampers IDthis
and rebroadcasts it, it’s similar to Case 1 of the RREQ
process. If Node M tampers IDM, the sink node can 
detect it when it verifies the MAC.
In the RREP process, a malicious node (Node M) 
broadcasts a tampered ID of the previous node, the 
current node or the next node. This is the same as case 
2 in the RREQ process. The next hop of Node M, 
Node N, can detect it.  
In the data forwarding process, if the node along 
the route tampers IDnext, other nodes drop it since their 
IDs cannot match the IDnext embedded in the data 
forwarding packet. The sender can detect the tampered 
IDnext since every node records its next two hops. It 
blacklists the next hop as the malicious node and 
reports it to the source node.  
3.2. Intermediate Node Drops Messages
In the route discovery, if a malicious node drops 
the RREQ packet, it blocks itself. The sink node can 
receive the RREQ packet through other routes. If the 
malicious node (Node M) drops the RREP packet, the 
next hop (Node N) can detect it since it cannot receive 
the packet again. In a data forwarding process, if a 
malicious node drops the data packet, the sender can 
detect it since it can not get acknowledgement from 
the next hop. It will inform it to the source node.  
3.3. Intermediate Node Modifies Messages
In the route discovery, if a malicious node 
modifies the RREQ core content, such as IDsource,
IDsink, IDRREQ, or Nsource, the sink node can detect it 
through verifying the MAC. It drops the corrupted 
RREQ packet, and receives it from other routes. If a 
malicious node modifies the RREP core content, such 
as sourceID , kIDsin  or RREQID , the source node can 
detect it through the MAC. In the data forwarding, we 
use the same solution as the case of the modified 
RREQ core content through verifying the MAC. In the 
query dissemination in the whole sensor network, the 
intermediate nodes can be compromised as Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Query dissemination 
The intermediate malicious node modifies the request 
query (reqQ) and broadcasts the changed request 
query (ChangedReqQ). The other sensor node receives 
the ChangedReqQ, and gets the query result which is 
packed up in the reply Query (replyQ). The query 
result contains the wrong information since the reqQ is 
tampered. The sink node receives the replyQ, and gets 
the reqQ from the replyQ packet. Here, the reqQ
actually is the ChangedReqQ. The sink node also can 
get the correct reqQ according to the QID. Then, it 
compares the correct reqQ with ChangedReqQ. If they 
match, the sink node can trust the query result from 
the reply packet. Otherwise, it drops it. 
3.4. Source Node is a Malicious Node 
If the source node is a malicious node, it tries to 
send abnormal messages to the sink node. The sink 
node can detect this after it compares the data with the 
record in the history and the neighboring node’s 
report. Then it sends the further request to the nodes in 
the cluster, and waits for the replies from these nodes 
for the further analysis. 
4. Performance Evaluation 
We use the NS2 [14] to evaluate the performance of 
the SecRout. In our simulation study, we use one 
source-destination pair. The source node sends a 
Constant Bit Rate (CBR) flow of 50 data packets per 
second. Each data packet is 50 bytes in size. We 
measure the performance using the following metrics 
[9]: 
• Packet Delivery Ratio: The total number of packets 
received is divided by the total number of 
application–level packets originated. 
• Byte Overhead: The total number of overhead bytes 
transmitted. 
• Packet Latency: The elapsed time between the 
application layer passing a packet to the routing 
layer and that packet first being received at the 
destination. 
The packet delivery ratios for SecRout and AODV
are shown in Figure 4. From Figure 4, we observe that 
at the beginning the packet delivery ratio for SecRout 
is lower than that for AODV. This is because AODV
builds the route faster than SecRout. But after SecRout 
creates the route to the sink node, the packet delivery 

























Figure 4. Packet delivery rate 
Byte overhead for SecRout and AODV is shown in 
Figure 5. From Figure 5, we observe that at the 
beginning SecRout has less byte overhead than AODV.
This is because AODV build the route faster, and then 
sends data packets faster. Since data packet has bigger 
size than the routing packet, SecRout has less byte 
overhead when it is still doing the route discovery 
while AODV has already sent the data packets. But on 
the average, SecRout is a little more byte overhead 
than AODV (less than 6%) since SecRout needs the 
security parameters, which are embedded in the data 





















Figure 5. Byte overhead 
Packet latency for SecRout and AODV is shown in 
Figure 6. From Figure 6, at the beginning SecRout has 
higher packet latency than AODV since AODV can 
build the route faster and therefore data can be sent 
faster. However, after SecRout builds the route, 






















Figure 6. Packet latency 
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5. Related work 
Perrig et al. [2] presented two security protocols, 
SNEP and μTESLA, for sensor networks using 
symmetric schemes. This paper only considers peer to 
peer architecture, has not considered the sensor 
network as a hierarchical structure. Failure of the 
nodes has not been considered in this paper. Yi et al. 
[15] proposed a security-aware routing protocol (SAR)
for wireless ad hoc networks. In this protocol, every 
node is set by one security level. The routing packet 
with the security parameters will make routing 
decisions according to the security parameters and the 
security level of the node. Papadimitratos and Haas 
[11] proposed a secure routing protocol (SRP) in 
MANET. The route request packet is composed of SRP
header in addition to the basic routing protocol packet 
and IP header. This routing discovery protocol can 
provide the correct connectivity information despite 
some compromised nodes in ad hoc networks. Hu et 
al. [9] proposed a secure efficient ad hoc distance 
vector routing protocol (SEAD) based on the design of 
the destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector routing 
protocol (DSDV). In this protocol, efficient one-way 
hash functions are used. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed the secure routing 
protocol for sensor networks (SecRout). The SecRout
can guarantee that the sink node gets the correct query 
result from the sensor network. In the SecRout
protocol, only high efficient symmetric cryptography 
is used. The two-level architecture is used, which 
dramatically lowers message overhead. Within the 
cluster, we secure messages using the cluster key. 
Among clusters, we encrypt the message using the 
shared key. In this paper, we also gave the security 
analysis for our protocol. We analyzed the different 
kinds of attacks, which may present in sensor 
networks. Our protocol is robust in presence of these 
attacks.  
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